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South Asia has been a prime beneficiary of globalization. Access to foreign educational 
institutions and ideas has produced some of the world’s best doctors and engineers, and 
foreign direct investment has created new industries and helped to turn cities into hubs of 
commerce. With the diffusion of knowledge, the well-being of the poor over vast swathes 
of the region has improved. Increasing mobile phone and Internet penetration has resulted 
in more aware populations that demand greater government services and accountability 
from their rulers.   
However, with globalization’s benefits have come tradeoffs: unfettered markets 
often fail to promote the social good, empowered weak institutions can lead to state capture 
and subsequently predation, and wider access to information enables benevolent and 
malevolent actors indiscriminately. Few countries offer a more revealing example of the 
two sides of globalization than Afghanistan.  
 Foreign influence prior to the mid-twentieth century was limited to Afghanistan’s 
small elite. The Cold War brought attention to the country in the form of competing U.S. 
and Soviet development assistance. The ouster of the Durrani monarchy in 1973 and 
subsequent political infighting and Islamic insurgency prompted the Soviet invasion and 
occupation. As the civil war in the 1990s gave way to Taliban ascendance, Afghanistan 
was ignored by and virtually cut off from the rest of the world. With the American military 
intervention in 2001, the country was suddenly inundated with foreign aid and exposed to 
global forces.  Long a social and economic backwater, Afghanistan was set on a course 
intended to build a modern state and economy.  
 International assistance has on the face of it been a positive aspect of Afghanistan’s 
connectivity with a global community. Political and economic institutions were erected 
and gains have occurred in education and health for a country with some of the world’s 
lowest socioeconomic indicators. Heavy international military assistance boosted 
economic growth sharply and created conditions for attracting foreign investment. Yet 
more than fifteen years later it is clear that international interest and engagement in 
Afghanistan has also carried perverse effects, including unsustainable and distorted 
economic growth, wider and deeper corruption, and flourishing markets for illicit goods.  
 Because much of the global integration that has occurred since 2001 was managed 
and mediated by foreign powers, our understanding of Afghanistan’s encounter with 
globalization has tended to emphasize its benefits rather than its costs. This paper seeks to 
provide a more balanced picture of the effects of globalization and regionalization as 
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viewed briefly through the lenses of Afghanistan’s narcotics trafficking, trade, and media 
scene.   
 
Narcotics Trafficking 
 
No other element in Afghanistan’s economy bears so clearly the marks of globalization as 
does narcotics, both contributing to the country’s economic survival and serving as a threat 
to its success as a state. Afghanistan’s narcotics trade is a deeply entrenched economic 
institution. The illicit economy, of which narcotics constitutes a large part, was the only 
mature part of Afghanistan’s economy to survive and prosper through decades of war. 
While narcotics production was already well integrated into the global economy by 2001, 
foreign anti-opium policies and global market forces have since solidified Afghanistan’s 
place as an opium producer. Today, the area of opium cultivation (in hectares) amounts to 
two and one-half to three times that of the 1994-2002 period and production has grown 
steadily since 2002 (Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016). Afghanistan produces 
approximately 90 percent of the world’s opium, providing virtually all the opium and 
morphine base for heroin found in Eurasia. 
 Opium cultivation at the household level is far from nefarious. In fact, it is part of 
a carefully calculated subsistence strategy that results from a lack of workable alternatives. 
Cheap and plentiful labor have cemented the dominance of this labor-intensive crop, a 
phenomenon that will continue to be exacerbated by tightening migration laws that restrict 
household abilities to diversify income streams. Opium has also proven to be a boon to 
local economies. Opium cultivation allows farmers to invest in agricultural infrastructure 
and purchase cars and commodities. More negatively, this income had an inflationary 
effect on markets across Afghanistan.  
 The extent of heroin demand emanating from Europe and Asia makes opium at 
least thirty times more profitable than wheat, and the absence of crop insurance or 
agricultural subsidies preclude poorer Afghans from substituting licit crops (Fishstein 
2014). The absence of credit independent of opium has also made growing at least some 
opium a necessity (Anderson 2015). Heightened access to information on agricultural 
techniques and variety types has increased opium productivity and profits, while traditional 
knowledge related to the cultivation of licit crops has eroded over the last several decades.  
 The interdiction and eradication policies pushed by the international community 
have also had the perverse effect of exacerbating the extractive nature of opium production 
and alienating the rural population. When enforced, interdiction and eradication policies 
spearheaded by the U.S. have often crippled local economies and led to widespread 
destitution in opium-dependent areas (Felbab-Brown 2013). Powerbrokers have corrupted 
eradication policies as a means to eliminate competitors, leading to the vertical integration 
of the narcotics market (Hogg et al. 2013). Farmers alienated because of crop eradication 
have in some areas welcomed back into their communities those Taliban promising to 
provide security from eradication (Hogg et al. 2013). The absence of security in rural areas 
and along trade routes leaves farmers open to extortion not only from criminal elements. 
This global trade has also profited the Taliban insurgents, who tax production and exact 
payment from drug traffickers in exchange for protection. 
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Trade 
 
Ultimately, Afghanistan can find prosperity only by being integrated into a regional trade 
that is itself interconnected with the global economy. Afghanistan’s neighborhood, the least 
regionally integrated region in the world, would stand to gain financially as well as from a 
security standpoint from greater interregional trade. Landlocked Afghanistan is uniquely 
positioned as a crossroads for this overland trade, and regional economic integration offers 
the best opportunity for sustained growth in the transport sector, one of the most successful 
sectors of the Afghan economy since 2001 (Hogg et al. 2013). Indeed, transport has 
continued to drive growth despite a sharp downturn in overall economic activity since 2012 
(Afghanistan Development Update 2016). With four hundred thousand Afghans expected 
to enter the workforce each year for the next decade, taking advantage of trade potential is 
a social and national security imperative (Afghanistan Development Update 2016). For 
Afghanistan, expanded trade also offers a feasible future alternative to Afghanistan’s 
current aid-dependent economy. 
 Overall, increased trade since 2001 has been a boon to the Afghan economy. 
Openness to foreign markets – particularly those of Pakistan, India, China, and Iran – has 
allowed Afghans to purchase cheap commodities that are either unavailable or 
prohibitively expensive when produced domestically. Indian demand for Afghan fruit has 
led to the reemergence of orchards—once the target of Soviet bombers —as a hub of licit 
agricultural activity (Afghanistan Development Update 2016). Afghanistan possesses the 
potential to become a regional agricultural producer if the government can secure roads 
and improve irrigation infrastructure. The ADB’s Western Basins Project (WBP) and the 
World Bank’s Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (EIRP) are steps in the right 
direction. Additionally, access to markets across Central and South Asia has allowed 
Afghanistan to decrease its reliance upon its adjacent neighbors for food imports. Wheat 
provides an apt example: while ten years ago most wheat imports would have come from 
Pakistan, Central Asia now provides the majority of Afghanistan’s imported wheat (Kabul 
Times 2016).  
 While the availability of cheap imports has allowed a growing proportion of 
Afghans access to consumer goods, lack of regulation has led to a profusion of 
unacceptably shoddy products. Nonexistent protections for industry and a lack of 
infrastructure preclude Afghan firms from producing alternatives to low-quality products.  
Additionally, the benefits of trade have been increasingly confined to a narrow set of actors. 
As in illicit markets, vertical integration accelerated after 2001, particularly among the 
traders that make up the middle of the supply chain (Fishstein 2015). These actors are often 
involved in trading both licit and illicit goods, spreading risk across markets in lieu of 
government price supports. Additionally, the transit trade has been co-opted by insurgents 
in various locales. This has been a major area of contestation between regional 
powerbrokers and the Taliban in the east of the country (Fishstein 2014). 
 The reliance of the Afghan economy upon imports has also left the country 
vulnerable to economic and political blackmail by its major trading partners. Afghans’ fear 
of punitive action is not unfounded: in February 2017, a spate of insurgent attacks in cities 
across Pakistan precipitated the closure of the Af-Pak border crossings at Torkham and 
Chaman, severing the critical Peshawar-Jalalabad and Quetta-Kandahar trade routes 
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(Ghazi 2017). The trade loss from the border closures is estimated to be three million 
dollars per day (Ghazi 2017). 
 
Media 
 
For decades Afghans have been avid consumers of media despite chronic poverty and 
underdeveloped communications infrastructure. Persistent conflict magnified the 
importance of news access, providing information that was critical to decision-making at 
the household level. Since 2001, Afghanistan has undergone a media and communications 
revolution, driven by demand that reflects the value the average Afghan continues to place 
on gathering news. The country’s exposure to foreign television programming has raised 
expectations among the public for more responsible governance and service delivery. 
Media has also presented the opportunity to strengthen people’s national identity and to 
access populations, such as women and the rural poor, that are normally so difficult to 
reach.  
 Media broadcasting is also one of few ways the international community can reach 
Afghans in far-flung or dangerous areas. Aid organizations have long recognized this 
reality, and they have shaped programming to bring about normative shifts in Afghan 
attitudes and behaviors. There is convincing evidence from qualitative studies and 
randomized trials conducted in Afghanistan in the 1990s that the content of popular BBC 
programming led to knowledge acquisition and behavioral change amongst Afghans 
(Adam 2005, 358-59). 
 The goal of American funding for Afghan media after 2001 was to foster a free and 
independent media. Though this vision has failed to materialize in full, the media has 
proven to be resilient despite the stifling effect of government regulation and the threat of 
violence levied by anti-state actors. Journalism training programs have had some degree of 
success in creating a cadre of young professional journalists, though the dangers of such a 
job lead to high turnover (Ayres 2012). Increased Pashto language programming is another 
positive development, allowing non-Taliban media to compete for hearts and minds in 
Afghanistan’s south and east (Fraenkel et al. 2010). 
 Several other aspects of this media revolution are more ambiguous. While the 
media leads Afghans toward increased political participation, people are also more likely 
to be critical of the government (Burbridge et al. 2016, 131). The increased availability of 
opposing viewpoints probably contributes to a sense of skepticism towards the status quo 
(Fraenkel et al. 2010), more so than when BBC and VOA were the only sources of news 
(“Afghan Media Survey” 2008). Many perceive the media to be divided along ethnic lines, 
and consider individual outlets to be biased (Fraenkel et al. 2010; Burbridge et al. 2016, 
131-140). While it is unclear whether this is indeed true, the difficulty inherent in sifting 
through all the news available in pursuit of the truth has prompted many Afghans to rely 
on traditional filtered sources such as their village shuras and maliks for news (Burbridge 
et al. 2016, 131, 136). 
 More negatively, this revolution has strengthened the ability of insurgent elements 
to influence the population and mobilize and recruit anti-state forces. New technologies 
that have contributed to unifying and securing the country have also been used by a more 
media savvy Taliban seeking to bring down the Afghan government and transform the state 
and society.  Cheaper and more widely available communication technology has allowed 
 5 
insurgent and anti-state actors to disseminate their message beyond their co-ethnics to 
wider and more varied audiences (Ali 2017). The Taliban recognized the importance of 
media early into their resurgence, and today the Taliban takes measures to disseminate its 
own media and to intimidate those news outlets critical of its actions (Zahid 2016). The 
self-styled Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) has been ramping up its profile on 
social media in an attempt to draw recruits away from the Taliban (Osman 2016). Warlords 
and regional powerbrokers have also adopted media as a tool to tighten their control. 
Journalism is a dangerous profession in Afghanistan, and victims and their families 
confront retributive violence meant to silence them.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Other areas of the Afghan economy and its society and governance also exemplify the 
bright and dark sides of Afghanistan’s global connectivity. International donor funding has 
been the mainstay of the country’s security sector, stimulated its economy, and helped build 
vital institutional administrative capacity. But massive military aid and generous economic 
and development assistance also stands accused of fueling corruption and distorting the 
Afghan economy. While private investment has injected capital and know-how into the 
economy, it has mostly attracted investors interested in extracting quick profits and has 
done little to contribute to sustainable economic growth. And the future riches promised 
by Afghanistan’s export of its mineral wealth could also invite the “resource-curse” 
associated with countries whose dependency on nonrenewable commodity exports 
paradoxically leaves them with weak economic growth, slowed development, and less 
democracy.    
 Whatever the costs of being exposed to global and regional influences and forces, 
the price for Afghanistan of isolation or neglect is far greater. A modern Afghanistan 
cannot be walled off. However, to optimize the opportunities offered by global engagement 
and avoid the pitfalls that can come with openness, Afghanistan needs political leadership 
and institutions able to manage the pace and scope of interconnectivity. The political 
cohesion, legal framework and infrastructure required to take advantage of globalization 
and minimize its vulnerabilities are unfortunately not yet in place. Nor is the security and 
stability that make successful global and regional connectivity ultimately possible.  
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